So far, privacy models follow two paradigms. The first paradigm, termed inferential privacy in this paper, focuses on the risk due to statistical inference of sensitive information about a target record from other records in the database. The second paradigm, known as differential privacy, focuses on the risk to an individual when included in, versus when not included in, the database. The contribution of this paper consists of two parts. The first part presents a critical analysis on differential privacy with two results: (i) the differential privacy mechanism does not provide inferential privacy, (ii) the impossibility result about achieving Dalenius's privacy goal [5] is based on an adversary simulated by a Turing machine, but a human adversary may behave differently; consequently, the practical implication of the impossibility result remains unclear. The second part of this work is devoted to a solution addressing three major drawbacks in previous approaches to inferential privacy: lack of flexibility for handling variable sensitivity, poor utility, and vulnerability to auxiliary information.
INTRODUCTION
There has been a significant interest in the analysis of data sets whose individual records are too sensitive to expose directly. Examples include medical records, financial data, insurance data, web query logs, user rating data for recommender systems, personal data from social networks, etc. Data of this kind provide rich information for data analysis in a variety of important applications, but access to such data may pose a significant risk to individual privacy, as illustrated in the following example. Example 1. A hospital maintains an online database for answering count queries on medical data like the table T in Table 1 . T contains three columns, Gender, Zipcode, and Disease, where Disease is a sensitive attribute. Suppose that an adversary tries to infer the disease of an individual Alice, . with the background knowledge that Alice, a female living in the area with Zipcode 61434, has a record in T . The adversary issues the following two queries Q1 and Q2: Q1: SELECT COUNT(*) FROM T WHERE Gender=F AND Zipcode=61434
Q2: SELECT COUNT(*) FROM T WHERE Gender=F AND Zipcode=61434 AND Disease=HIV
Each query returns the number of participants (records) who match the description in the WHERE clause. Suppose that the answers for Q1 and Q2 are x and y, respectively. The adversary then estimates that Alice has HIV with probability y/x, and if y/x and x are "sufficiently large", there will be a privacy breach.
Inferential vs Differential
In the above example, the adversary infers that the rule (Gender = F ∧ Zipcode = 61434) → (Disease = HIV ) holds with the probability y/x and that Alice has HIV with the probability y/x, assuming that the (diseases of) records follow some underlying probability distribution. This type of reasoning, which learns information about one record from the statistics of other records, is found in many advanced applications such as recommender systems, prediction models, viral marketing, social tagging, and social networks. The same technique could be misused to infer sensitive information about an individual like in the above example. According to the Privacy Act of Canada, publishing the above query answers would breach Alice's privacy because they disclose Alice's disease with a high accuracy. In this paper, inferential privacy refers to the requirement of limiting the statistical inference of sensitive information about a target record from other records in the database. See [1] for a list of works in this field.
One recent breakthrough in the study of privacy preservation is differential privacy [5] [7] . In an "impossibility result", the authors of [5] [7] showed that it is impossible to achieve Dalenius's absolute privacy goal for statistical databases: any-thing that can be learned about a respondent from the statistical database should be learnable without access to the database. Instead of limiting what can be learnt about one record from other records, the differential privacy mechanism hides the presence or absence of a participant in the database, by producing noisy query answers such that the distribution of query answers changes very little when the database differs in any single record. The following definition is from [4] . Definition 1. A randomized function K gives ε-differential privacy if for all data sets T and T differing on at most one record, for all queries Q, and for all outputs x, P r[K(T, Q) = x] ≤ exp(ε)P r[K(T , Q) = x].
With a small ε, the presence or absence of an individual is hidden because T and T are almost equally likely to be the underlying database that produces the final output of the query. Some frequently cited claims of the differential privacy mechanism are that it provides privacy without any assumptions about the data and that it protects against arbitrary background information. But there is no free lunch in data privacy, as pointed out by Kifer and Machanavajjhala recently [14] . Their study shows that assumptions about the data and the adversaries are required if hiding the evidence of participation, instead of the presence/absence of records in the database, is the privacy goal, which they argue should be a major privacy definition.
Contributions
The contribution of this paper consists of two parts. In the first part, we argue that differential privacy is insufficient because it does not provide inferential privacy. We present two specific results:
• (Section 2.1) Using a differential inference theorem, we show that the noisy query answers returned by the differential privacy mechanism may derive an inference probability that is arbitrarily close to the inference probability obtained from the noise-free query answers. This study suggests that providing inferential privacy remains a meaningful research problem, despite the protection of differential privacy.
• (Section 2.2) While the impossibility result in [5] is based on an adversary simulated by a Turing machine, a human adversary may behave differently when evaluating the sensitivity of information. We use the Terry Gross example, which is a key motivation of differential privacy, to explain this point. This study suggests that the practical implication of the impossibility result remains unclear.
Given that inferential privacy remains relevant, the second part of this work is devoted to stronger solutions for inferential privacy. Previous approaches suffer from three major limitations. Firstly, most solutions are unable to handle sensitive values that have skewed distribution and varied sensitivity. For example, with the Occupation attribute in the Census data (Section 7) having the minimum and maximum frequency of 0.18% and 7.5%, the maximum -diversity [19] that can be provided is 13-diversity because of the eligibility requirement 1/ ≥ 7.5% [22] . Therefore, it is impossible to protect the infrequent items at the tail of the distribution or more sensitive items by a larger -diversity, say 50-diversity, which is more than 10 times the prior 0.18%. Secondly, even if it is possible to achieve such -diversity, enforcing -diversity with a large across all sensitive values leads to a large information loss. Finally, previous solutions are vulnerable to additional auxiliary information [21] [13] [17] . We address these issues in three steps.
• (Section 3) To address the first two limitations in the above, we consider a sensitive attribute with domain values x1, · · · , xm such that each xi has a different sensitivity, thus, a tolerance f i on inference probability. We consider a bucketization problem in which buckets of different sizes can be formed to accommodate different requirements f i . The goal is to find a collection of buckets for a given set of records so that a notion of information loss related to bucket size is minimized and the privacy constraint f i of all xi's is satisfied.
• (Sections 4, 5, and 7)
We present an efficient algorithm for the case of two distinct bucket sizes (but many buckets) with guaranteed optimality, and a heuristic algorithm for the general case. The empirical study on real life data sets shows that both solutions are good approximations of optimal solutions in the general case and better deal with a sensitive attribute of skewed distribution and varied sensitivity.
• (Section 6) We adapt our solutions to guard against two previously identified strong attacks, corruption attack [21] and negative association attack [13] [17] (see more details in Section 6).
Related Work
Limiting statistical disclosure has been a topic extensively studied in the field of statistical databases, see [1] for a list of works. This problem was recently examined in the context of privacy preserving data publishing and some representative privacy models include ρ1-ρ2 privacy [9] , -diversity principle [19] , and t-closeness [16] . All of these works assume uniform sensitivity across all sensitive values. One exception is the personalized privacy in [23] where a record owner can specify his/her privacy threshold. Another exception is [18] where each sensitive value may have a different privacy setting. To achieve the privacy goal, these works require a taxonomy of domain values to generalize the attributes, thus, cannot be applied if such taxonomy is not available. The study in [22] shows that generalized attributes are not useful for count queries on raw values. Dealing with auxiliary information is a hard problem in data privacy [21] [13] [17] , and so far there is little satisfactory solution.
There have been a great deal of works in differential privacy since the pioneer work [7] [5]. This includes, among others, contingency table releases [2] , estimating the degree distribution of social networks [11] , histogram queries [12] and the number of permissible queries [24] . These works are concerned with applications of differential privacy in various scenarios. Unlike previous works, the authors of [14] argue that hiding the evidence of participation, instead of the presence/absence of records in the database, should be a major privacy definition, and this privacy goal cannot be achieved with making assumptions about the data and the adversaries.
ANALYZING DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
This section presents a critical analysis on the differential privacy mechanism. In Section 2.1 we show that the differential privacy mechanism allows violation of inferential privacy. In Section 2.2 we argue that a human adversary may behave differently from some assumptions made in the impossibility result of [5] , thus, the practical implication of the impossibility result remains unclear.
On Violating Inferential Privacy
One popularized claim of the differential privacy mechanism is that it protects an individual's information even if an attacker knows about all other individuals in the data. We quote the original discussion from [3] (pp 3):
"If there is information about a row that can be learned from other rows, this information is not truly under the control of that row. Even if the row in question were to sequester itself away in a high mountaintop cave, information about the row that can be gained from the analysis of other rows is still available to an adversary. It is for this reason that we focus our attention on those inferences that can be made about rows without the help of others."
In other words, the differential privacy framework does not consider violation to inferential privacy and the reason is that it is not under the control of the target row. Two points need clarification. Firstly, a user submits her sensitive data to an organization because she trusts that the organization will do everything possible to protect her sensitive information; indeed, the data publisher has full control in how to release the data or query answers in order to protect individual privacy. Secondly, learning information about one record from other records could pose a risk to an individual if the learnt information is accurate about the individual. This type of learning assumes that records follow some underlying probability distribution, which is widely adapted by prediction models in many real applications. Under this assumption, suppose Q1 and Q2 in Example 1 have the answers x = 100 and y = 99, even if Alice's record is removed from the database, it is still valid to infer that Alice has HIV with a high probability.
Next, we show that even if the differential privacy mechanism adds noises to the answers for queries Q1 and Q2, Alice's disease can still be inferred using the noisy answers.
Let x and y be the true answers to Q1 and Q2. We assume that x and y are non-zero. The differential privacy mechanism will return the noisy answers X = x + ξ1 and Y = y + ξ2 for Q1 and Q2, after adding noises ξ1 and ξ2. Consider the most used Laplace distribution Lap(b) = 2 . The next theorem is due to [5] . Theorem 1.
[5] For a count query Q, the mechanism K that adds independently generated noise ξ with distribution Lap(1/ε) to the output enjoys ε-differential privacy.
The next theorem shows that Y /X is a good approximation of y/x. Theorem 2 (Differential Inference Theorem). Given two queries Q1 and Q2 as above, let x and y be the true answers and let X and Y be the answers returned by the ε-differential privacy mechanism. E[ ] of Y /X can be approximated as follows: ] as required.
The next corollary follows from the fact that y x ≤ 1 and b is a constant for a given ε-differential privacy mechanism K. ] gets arbitrarily close to zero.
Corollary 1 suggests that Y /X, where Y and X are the noisy query answers returned by the differential privacy mechanism, can be a good estimate of the inference probability y/x for a large query answer x. For example, for ε = 0.1 and x = 100, ] is small in these cases.
On The Impossibility Results
A key motivation behind differential privacy is the impossibility result about the Dalenius's privacy goal [5] . Intuitively, it says that for any privacy mechanism and any distribution satisfying certain conditions, there is always some particular piece of auxiliary information, z, so that z alone is useless to an adversary who tries to win, while z in combination with access to the data through the privacy mechanism permits the adversary to win with probability arbitrarily close to 1. The proof assumes an adversary simulated by a Turing machine. We argue that a human adversary, who also considers the "semantics" when evaluating the usefulness of information, may behave differently. Let us explain this point by the Terry Gross example that was originally used to capture the intuition of the impossibility result in [6] .
In the Terry Gross example, the exact height is considered private, thus, useful to an adversary, whereas the auxiliary information of being two inches shorter than an unknown average is considered not private, thus, not useful. Under this assumption, accessing the statistical database, which returns the average height, is to blame for disclosing Terry Gross's privacy. Mathematically, knowing the exact height is a remarkable progress from knowing two inches shorter than an unknown average. However, to a human adversary, the information about how an individual deviates from the statistics already discloses the sensitive information, regardless of what the statistics is. For example, once knowing that someone took the HIV check-up ten times more frequently than an unknown average, his/her privacy is already leaked. Here, a human adversary is able to interpret "deviation" as a sensitive notion based on "life experiences", even though mathematically deviation does not derive the exact height. It is unclear whether such a human adversary can be simulated by a Turing machine.
In practice, a realistic privacy definition does allow disclosure of sensitive information in a controlled manner and there are scenarios where it is possible to protect inferential privacy while retaining a reasonable level of data utility. For example, the study in [10] shows that the anonymized data is useful for training a classifier because the training does not depend on detailed personal information. Another scenario is when the utility metric is different from the adversary's target. Suppose that the attribute Disease is sensitive and the response attribute R (to a medicine) is not. Learning the following rules does not violate privacy
in that a positive response does not indicate a specific disease with certainty. However, these rules are useful for a researcher to exclude the diseases x1 and x2 in the absence of a positive response. Even for a sensitive attribute like Disease, the varied sensitivity of domain values (such as Flu and HIV) could be leveraged to retain more utility for less sensitive values while ensuring strong protection for highly sensitive items. In the rest of the paper, we present an approach of leveraging such varied sensitivity to address some drawbacks in previous approaches to inferential privacy.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section defines the problem we will study. First, we present our model of adversaries, privacy, and data utility.
Preliminaries
The database is a microdata table T (QI, SA) with each record corresponding to a participant. QI is a set of nonsensitive attributes {A1, · · · , A d }. SA is a sensitive attribute and has the domain {x1, · · · , xm}. m is the domain size of SA, also written |SA|. Each xi is called a sensitive value or a SA value. oi denotes the number of records for xi in T and fi denotes the frequency oi/|T |, where |T | is the cardinality of T . For a record r in T , t[QI] and r[SA] denote the values of r on QI and SA. Table 3 lists some of the notations used in this paper.
An adversary wants to infer the SA value of a target individual t. The adversary has access to a published version of T , denoted by T * . For each SA value xi, P r(xi|t, T * ) denotes the probability that t is inferred to have xi. For now, we consider an adversary with the following auxiliary information: a t's record is contained in T , t's values on QI, i.e., t [QI] , and the algorithm used to produce T * . Additional auxiliary information will be considered in Section 6.
One approach for limiting P r(xi|t, T * ) is bucketization [22] . In this approach, the records in T are grouped into small-size buckets and each bucket is identified by a unique bucket ID, 
BID.
We use g to refer to both a bucket and the bucket ID of a bucket, depending on the context. T * is published in two tables, QIT (QI, BID) and ST (BID, SA). For each record r in T that is grouped into a bucket g, QIT contains a record (r[QI], g) and ST contains a record (g, r[SA]) (with duplicates preserved). For a target individual t with t[QI] contained in a bucket g, the probability of inferring a SA value xi using g, P r(xi|t, g), is equal to |g, xi|/|g|, where |g, xi| denotes the number of occurrence of (g, xi) in ST and |g| denotes the size of g. P r(xi|t, T * ) is defined to be the maximum P r(xi|t, g) for any bucket g containing t[QI] [22] .
Example 2. For the microdata T in Table 1 , Gender and Zipcode are the QI attributes and Disease is SA. Table 2 shows the QIT and ST for one bucketization. To infer the SA value of Alice with QI = F, 61434 , the adversary first locates the bucket that contains F, 61434 , i.e., BID = 2. There are two diseases in this bucekt, Cancer and HIV, each occurring once. So P r(xi|Alice, 2) = 50%, where xi is either Cancer or HIV.
Privacy Specification
We consider the following privacy specification.
Definition 2 (F -Privacy).
For each SA value xi, f iprivacy specifies the requirement that P r(xi|t, T * ) ≤ f i , where f i is a real number in the range (0,1]. F -privacy is a collection of f i -privacy for all SA values xi.
For example, the publisher may set f i = 1 for some xi's that are not sensitive at all, set f i manually to a small value for a few highly sensitive values xi, and set f i = min{1, a × fi + b} for the rest of SA values whose sensitivity grows linearly with their frequency, where a and b are constants. Our approach assumes that f i is specified but does not depend on how f i is specified. The next lemma follows easily and the proof is omitted. Remark 1. To model a given F -privacy specification by -diversity [19] , the smallest required is set by = 1/minif i . If some xi is highly sensitive, i.e., has a small f i , this will be too large for less sensitive xi's. This leads to poor utility for two reasons. First, the previous bucketization [22] produces buckets of the sizes or + 1. Thus, a large leads to large buckets and a large information loss. Second, a large implies that the eligibility requirement [22] for having adiversity T * , i.e., 1/ ≥ maxifi, is more difficult to satisfy. In contrast, the corresponding eligibility requirement for having F -privacy T * is f i ≥ fi for all xi's (Lemma 1), which is much easier to satisfy. In Section 3.4, we will address the large bucket size issue by allowing buckets of different sizes to be formed to accommodate different requirements f i .
Utility Metrics
Within each bucket g, the QI value of every record is equally likely associated with the SA value of every record through the common BID. Therefore, the bucket size |g| serves as a measure of the "disorder" of such association. This observation motivates the following notion of information loss.
Any bucketization T * has a M SE in the range [0, |T | − 1]. The raw data T is one extreme where each record itself is a bucket, so M SE = 0. The single bucket containing all records is the other extreme where M SE = |T | − 1. With |T | being fixed, to minimize M SE, we shall minimize the following loss metric:
Note that Loss has the additivity property: if
Problem Description
To minimize Loss, we consider a general form of bucketization in which buckets of different sizes can be formed so that a large bucket size is used for records having a more sensitive xi (i.e., a small f i ) and a small bucket size is used for records having less sensitive xi (i.e., a larger f i ). A collection of buckets can be specified by a bucket setting of the form B1(S1, b1), · · · , Bq(Sq, bq) , where bj is the number of buckets of the size Sj, j = 1, · · · , q, and S1 < · · · < Sq. We also denote a bucket setting simply by ∪Bj. s(Bj) = bjSj denotes the total size of the buckets in Bj. Following Definition 2, the collection of buckets specified by ∪Bj has the loss q j=1 bj × (Sj − 1)
2 . We denote this loss by Loss(∪Bj). A bucket setting ∪Bj is feasible wrt T if j s(Bj) = |T |. A feasible bucket setting is valid wrt F -privacy if there is an assignment of the records in T to the buckets in ∪Bj such that no SA value xi has a frequency more than f i in any bucket g, i.e., P r(xi|t, g) ≤ f i . Such assignment is called a valid record assignment.
Definition 4 (Optimal multi-size bucket setting).
Given T and F -privacy, we want to find a valid bucket setting B1(S1, b1), · · · , Bq(Sq, bq) that has the minimum Loss(∪Bj) among all valid bucket settings.
This problem must determine the number q of distinct bucket sizes, each bucket size Sj and the number bj of buckets for the size Sj, 1 ≤ j ≤ q. The following special case is a building block of our solution.
Definition 5 (Optimal two-size bucket setting). Given T and F -privacy, we want to find a valid two-size bucket setting B1(S1, b1), B2(S2, b2) that has the minimum loss among all valid two-size bucket settings.
Remark 2. The bucket setting problem is challenging for several reasons. Firstly, allowing varied sensitivity f i and buckets of different sizes Sj introduces the new challenge of finding the best bucket setting that can fulfil the requirement f i for all xi's. Even for a given bucket setting, it is nontrivial to validate whether there is a valid record assignment to the buckets. Secondly, the number of feasible bucket settings of the form (S1, b1), · · · , (Sq, bq) is huge, rendering it prohibitive to enumerate all bucket settings. For example, suppose that S1 and S2 are chosen from the range of [3, 20] , and |T | = 1, 000, 000, there are a total of 2,077,869 feasible bucket settings of the form (S1, b1) and (S2, b2). This number will be much larger if q > 2. Finally, the number of distinct bucket sizes q is unknown in advance and must be searched.
Section 4 presents an algorithm for validating a two-size bucket setting. Section 5 presents an efficient algorithm for the optimal two-size bucket setting problem with guaranteed optimality, and a heuristic algorithm for the multi-size bucket setting problem.
VALIDATING TWO-SIZE BUCKET SET-TING
Let V alid(B, T, F ) denote a function that tests if a bucket setting B is valid. We assume that the number of occurrence oi for xi in T has been collected, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. In Section 4.1, we consider buckets having the same size and we give an O(m) time and space algorithm for evaluating V alid(B, T, F ). In Section 4.2, we consider buckets having two different sizes and give an O(m) time and space algorithm for V alid(B, T, F ). In both cases, we give a linear time algorithm for finding a valid record assignment for a valid bucket setting.
One-Size Bucket Setting
Let B = {g0, · · · , g b−1 } be a set of b buckets of the same size S. To validate this bucket setting, we introduce a roundrobin assignment of records to buckets.
Round-Robin Assignment (RRA): For each value xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we assign the t-th record of xi to the bucket gs, where s = (o1 + · · · + oi−1 + t) mod b, where oi is the number of occurrence of xi in T . In other words, the records for xi are assigned to the buckets in a round-robin manner; the order in which xi is considered by RRA is not important. It is easy to see that the number of records for xi assigned to a bucket is either |oi|/b or |oi|/b . The next lemma gives a sufficient and necessary condition for V alid(B, T, F ) = true. 
Two-Size Bucket Setting
Now we consider a two-size bucket setting of the form B1(S1, b1), B2(S2, b2) . The next lemma follows trivially.
Lemma 3. V alid(B1∪B2, T, F ) = true if and only if there is a partition of T , {T1, T2}, such that V alid(B1, T1, F ) = true and V alid(B2, T2, F ) = true.
Definition 6. Given F -privacy, for each xi and for j = 1, 2, we define uij = f i Sj bj and aij = min{uij, oi}.
From Lemma 2(4), uij is the upper bound on the number of records for xi that can be allocated to Bj without violating f i -privacy, assuming unlimited supply of xi records. aij is the upper bound, assuming the actual supply of xi records, i.e., oi. The next theorem gives the condition for V alid(B1 ∪ B2, T, F ) = true. ∀i : ai1 + ai2 ≥ oi (P rivacy Constraint(P C)) (3)
Proof. Intuitively, Equation (3) says that the number of occurrence of xi does not exceed the upper bound ai1+ai2 imposed by F -privacy on all buckets collectively, thus, the name Privacy Constraint. Equation (4) says that under this upper bound constraint it is possible to fill up the buckets in Bj without leaving unused slots, thus, the name Fill Constraint. Equation (5) says that the total bucket capacity matches the data cardinality, thus the name Capacity Constraint. Clearly, all these conditions are necessary for a valid assignment. The sufficiency proof is given by the algorithm in the next subsection that finds a valid assignment of the records in T to the buckets in B1 and B2, assuming that the above conditions hold.
In the rest of the paper, PC, FC, and CC denote Privacy Constraint, Fill Constraint, and Capacity Constraint in Theorem 3.
Corollary 
Record Partitioning
Suppose that PC, FC and CC in Theorem 3 hold. We show how to find a partition {T1, T2} of T such that V alid(B1, T1, F ) = true and V alid(B2, T2, F ) = true. This provides the sufficiency proof for Theorem 3 because Lemma 3 implies V alid(B1∪ B2, T, F ) = true. By finding the partition {T1, T2}, we also provide an algorithm for assigning records from T to the buckets in B1 ∪ B2, that is, simply applying RRA to each of (Tj, Bj), j = 1, 2.
The partition {T1, T2} can be created as follows. For each SA value xi, initially T1 contains any ai1 records and T2 contains the remaining oi − ai1 records for xi. Since ai1 ≤ ui1, Lemma 2(4) holds on (T1, B1). (Note that in this case, oi in Lemma 2 is the number of occurrence of xi in T1.) PC implies that the number of occurrence of xi in T2, i.e., oi − ai1, is no more than ai2, therefore, Lemma 2(4) also holds on (T2, B2). FC implies |T1| ≥ s(B1). If |T1| = s(B1), |T2| = s(B2) (i.e., CC), from the above discussion and Lemma 2, V alid(B1, T1, F ) = true and V alid(B2, T2, F ) = true. We are done.
We now assume |T1| > s(B1), thus |T2| < s(B2). We need to move |T1| − s(B1) records from T1 to T2 without exceeding the upper bound ai2 for T2. FC implies that such moves are possible because there must be some xi for which less than ai2 records are found in T2. For such xi, we move records of xi from T1 to T2 until the number of records for xi in T2 reaches ai2 or until |T2| = s(B2), whichever comes first. Since we move a record for xi to T2 only when there are less than ai2 records for xi in T2, the condition of Lemma 2(4) is preserved on (T2, B2). Clearly, moving a record out of T1 always preserves the condition of Lemma 2(4) on (T1, B1). As long as |T2| < s(B2), the above argument can be repeated to move more records from T1 to T2.
Eventually, we have |T2| = s(B2), so V alid(B1, T1, F ) = true and V alid(B2, T2, F ) = true. The {T1, T2} is the partition required. x9-x12: oi = 6, fi = 0.12 and f i = 0.29. x13-x14: oi = 9, fi = 0.18 and f i = 0.41.
Consider the bucket setting B1(S1 = 4, b1 = 9), B2(S2 = 14, b2 = 1). Note CC in Theorem 3 holds. Let us compute ai1 and ai2. ai1 = min{ui1, oi}: For x1-x8, ui1 = f i S1 b1 = 0.09 × 4 × 9 = 0, so ai1 = 0. For x9-x12, ui1 = 0.29 × 4 × 9 = 9, ai1 = 6. For x13-x14, ui1 = 0.41 × 4 × 9 = 9, ai1 = 9. ai2 = min{ui2, oi}: For x1-x8, ui2 = f i S2 b2 = 0.09 × 14 × 1 = 1, ai2 = 1. For x9-x12, ui2 = 0.29 × 14 × 1 = 4, ai2 = 4. For x13-x14, ui2 = 0.41 × 14 × 1 = 5, ai2 = 5.
It can be verified that PC and FC in Theorem 3 hold. To find the partitioning {T1, T2}, initially T1 contains ai1 = 0 record for each of x1-x8, ai1 = 6 records for each of x9-x12, and ai1 = 9 records for each of x13-x14. T2 contains the remaining records in T . Since T1 contains 42 records, but s(B1) = 36, we need to move 6 records from T1 to T2 without exceeding the upper bound ai2 for T2. This can be done by moving one record for each of x9 − x14 from T1 to T2. Figure  1 shows a record assignment generated by RRA for (B1, T1) and (B2, T2).
FINDING OPTIMAL BUCKET SETTINGS
We now present an efficient algorithm for finding the optimal bucket setting. Section 5.1 presents an exact solution for the two-size bucket setting problem. Section 5.2 presents a heuristic solution for the multi-size bucket setting problem.
Algorithms for Two-Size Bucket Settings
Given T and F -privacy, we want to find the valid bucket setting of the form B1(S1, b1), B2(S2, b2) , where bj ≥ 0 and S1 < S2, such that the following loss is minimized
One approach is applying Theorem 3 to validate each feasible bucket setting (B1, B2), but this is inefficient because the number of such bucket settings can be huge (Remark 2). We present a more efficient algorithm that prunes the bucket settings that are not valid or do not have the minimum loss.
Observe that f i -privacy implies that a record for xi must be placed in a bucket of size at least 1/f i ; therefore, the minimum size for S1 and S2 is M = mini{ 1/f i }. The maximum bucket size M for S1 and S2 is constrained by the maximum loss allowed. We assume that M is given, where M > M . We consider only (S1, S2) such that M ≤ S1 < S2 ≤ M . Note that a valid bucket setting may not exist in this range of size.
Indexing Bucket Settings
We first present an "indexing" structure for feasible bucket settings to allow a direct access to any feasible bucket setting. We say that a pair (b1, b2) is feasible (resp. valid ) wrt (S1, S2) if the bucket setting B1(S1, b1), B2(S2, b2) is feasible (resp. valid). A valid pair (b1, b2) is optimal wrt (S1, S2) if Loss(B1 ∪ B2) is minimum among all valid pairs wrt (S1, S2). We define Γ(S1, S2) to be the list of all feasible (b1, b2) in the descending order of b1, thus, in the ascending order of b2. Intuitively, an earlier bucket setting has more smaller buckets, thus, a smaller Loss, than a later bucket setting. Below, we show that the i-th pair in Γ(S1, S2) can be generated directly using the position i without scanning the list. We will use this property to locate all valid pairs by a binary search on Γ(S1, S2) without storing the list. To this end, it suffices to identify the first and last pairs in Γ(S1, S2), and the increments of b1 and b2 between two consecutive pairs.
The first pair in Γ(S1, S2), denoted (b 
b1 and b2 are variables of non-negative integers and S1, S2, |T | are constants. Next, consider two consecutive pairs (b1, b2) and (b1−∆1, b2+ ∆2) in Γ(S1, S2). Since S1b1 + S2b2 = |T | and S1(b1 − ∆1) + S2(b2 + ∆2) = |T |, S1∆1 = S2∆2. Since ∆1 and ∆2 are the smallest positive integers such that this equality holds, S2∆2 must be the least common multiple of S1 and S2, denoted by LCM (S1, S2). ∆2 and ∆1 are then given by ∆2 = LCM (S1, S2)/S2, ∆1 = LCM (S1, S2)/S1 (8) Therefore, the ith pair in Γ(S1, S2) has the form (b 
The only integer i satisfying this condition is given by
Lemma 4. Γ(S1, S2) has the form
Remark 3. Γ(S1, S2) in Lemma 4 has several important properties for dealing with a large data set. Firstly, we can access the i-th element of Γ(S1, S2) without storing or scanning the list. Secondly, we can represent any sublist of Γ(S1, S2) by a bounding interval [i, j] where i is the starting position and j is the ending position of the sublist. Thirdly, the common sublist of two sublists L and L of Γ(S1, S2), denoted by L ∩ L , is given by the intersection of the bounding intervals of L and L . The length k of Γ(S1, S2), given by Equation (9), is proportional to the cardinality |T |. b 0 1 is as large as |T |/S1 (when b 0 2 = 0) and ∆1 is no more than S2. Thus k is as large as |T |/(S1S2). With S1 and S2 being small, k is proportional to |T |. Therefore, examining all pairs in Γ(S1, S2) is not scalable. In the rest of this section, we explore two pruning strategies to prune unpromising pairs (b1, b2) in Γ(S1, S2), one based on loss minimization and one based on privacy requirement.
Loss-Based Pruning
Our first strategy is pruning the pairs in Γ(S1, S2) that do not have the minimum loss wrt (S1, S2), by exploiting the following monotonicity of Loss, which follows from the descending order of b1, S1 < S2, and Equation (6).
Lemma 5 (Monotonicity of loss). If
, where Bj contains bj buckets of size Sj, and B j contains b j buckets of size Sj, j = 1, 2.
Thus the first valid pair in Γ(S1, S2) is the optimal pair wrt (S1, S2). Lemma 5 can also be exploited to prune pairs across different (S1, S2). Let Best loss be the minimum loss found so far and (S1, S2) be the next pair of sizes to be considered. From Lemma 5, all the pairs in Γ(S1, S2) that have a loss less than Best loss must form a prefix of Γ(S1, S2). Let (b * 1 , b * 2 ) be the cutoff point of this prefix, where b *
The next lemma revises Γ(S1, S2) by the cutoff point based on Best loss .
Lemma 6 (Loss-based pruning). Let Best loss be the minimum loss found so far and let (S1, S2) be the next pair of sizes to consider. Let k = min{k, k * }, where k is given by Equation (9) and k * is given by Equation (11) . Let Γ (S1, S2) denote the prefix of Γ(S1, S2) that contains the first k + 1 pairs. It suffices to consider Γ (S1, S2).
In the rest of this section, Γ denotes Γ (S1, S2) when S1 and S2 are clear from context.
Privacy-Based Pruning
From Lemma 5, the optimal pair wrt (S1, S2) is the first valid pair in Γ . Our second strategy is to locate the first valid pair in Γ directly by exploiting a certain monotonicity property of the condition for a valid pair. First, we introduce some terminology. Consider any sublist L of Γ and any boolean condition C on a pair. H(C, L) denotes the set of all pairs in L on which C holds, and F (C, L) denotes the set of all pairs in L on which C fails. C is monotone in L if whenever C holds on a pair in L, it holds on all later pairs in L, and anti-monotone in L if whenever C fails on a pair in L, it fails on all later pairs in L. A monotone C splits L into two sublists F (C, L) and H(C, L) in that order, and an antimonotone C splits L into two sublists H(C, L) and F (C, L) in that order. Therefore, if we can show that FC and PC in Theorem 3 are monotone or anti-monotone, we can locate all valid pairs in Γ , i.e., those satisfying both FC and PC, by a binary search over Γ . We consider FC and PC separately.
Monotonicity of FC. Let F C(S1) denote FC for j = 1, and F C(S2) denote FC for j = 2. Note that H(F C, Γ ) is given by H(F C(S1), Γ ) ∩ H(F C(S2), Γ ).
Lemma 7 (Monotonicity of FC). F C(S1) is monotone in Γ and F C(S2) is anti-monotone in Γ .
Proof. We rewrite FC as
Assume that (b1, b2) precedes (b 1 , b 2 ) in Γ . Then b1 > b 1 and b2 < b 2 . As b1 decreases to b 1 , both f i S1 b1 and S1b1 decreases by a factor by b 1 /b1, but oi remains unchanged. Therefore, if Equation (12) holds for (b1, b2), it holds for (b 1 , b 2 ) as well; so Equation (12) is monotone on Γ . For a similar reason, if Equation (13) fails on (b1, b2), it remains to fail on (b 1 , b 2 ) as well; thus Equation (13) is anti-monotone on Γ .
Monotonicity of PC. Let P C(xi) denote PC for xi. H(P C, Γ ) is given by ∩iH(P C(xi), Γ ). To compute H(P C(xi), Γ ), we rewrite P C(xi) as min{ f i S1 b1, oi} + min{ f i S2 b2, oi} ≥ oi
Since b1 is decreasing and b2 is increasing in Γ , f i S1 b1 ≥ oi is anti-monotone and f i S2 b2 ≥ oi is monotone in Γ . Note Equation (14) holds in H( f i S1 b1 ≥ oi, Γ ) and H( f i S2 b2 ≥ oi, Γ ). Let us consider the remaining part of Γ , denoted by Γ (xi):
In this part, Equation (14), thus P C(xi), degenerates into
Consider (16) and any two consecutive pairs (b1, b2) and (b1 − ∆1, b2 + ∆2) in Γ (xi). If Equation (16) holds, Equation (15) holding on (b1, b2) implies that it holds on (b1 −∆1, b2 +∆2), thus, Equation (15) is monotone; if Equation (16) fails, Equation (15) failing on (b1, b2) implies that it fails on (b1 − ∆1, b2 + ∆2), thus, Equation (15) is anti-monotone. Recall that in Γ (xi), P C(xi) degenerates into Equation (15) . The next lemma summarizes the above discussion.
Lemma 8 (Monotonicity of PC).
(i) f i S1 b1 ≥ oi is anti-monotone in Γ and f i S2 b2 ≥ oi is monotone in Γ .
(ii) If Equation (16) holds, P C(xi) is monotone in Γ (xi), and if Equation (16) fails, P C(xi) is anti-monotone in Γ (xi).
Corollary 3. H(P C(xi), Γ ) consists of H( f i S1 b1 ≥ oi, Γ ), H(P C(xi), Γ (xi)), and H( f i S2 b2 ≥ oi, Γ ).
Algorithms
The next theorem gives a computation of all pairs in Γ satisfying both PC and FC, i.e., all valid pairs in Γ . Proof. (i) follows from Theorem 3. From Lemma 5, the first pair in Γ * has the minimum loss wrt (S1, S2). To see (iii), the monotonicities in Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, and Corollary 3, imply that each sublist involved in computing Γ * can be found by a binary search over Γ , which takes O(m log |T |) time (note that the length k of Γ is no more than |T |). Note that intersecting two sublists takes O(1). The O(m) space follows from the fact that each sublist is represented by its bounding interval and any element of Γ examined by a binary search can be generated based on its position without storing the list.
for all {S2 = S1 + 1; S2 ≤ M ; S2 + +} do 6: compute Γ * using Theorem 4 7:
if Γ * is not empty then 8:
let (b1, b2) be the first pair in Γ *
9:
let Bj be the set of bj buckets of size Sj, j = 1, 2 10:
if Best loss > Loss(B1 ∪ B2) then 11:
Bestsetting ← (S1, b1), (S2, b2) 12:
Best loss ← Loss(B1 ∪ B2) 13: return Bestsetting Algorithm 1 presents the algorithm for finding the optimal two-size bucket setting based on Theorem 4, TwoSizeBucketing. The input consists of a table T , a privacy parameter F , and the minimum and maximum bucket sizes M and M . Line 1 computes oi in one scan of T . Lines 2 and 3 initialize Best loss and Bestsetting. Lines 4 and 5 iterate through all pairs (S1, S2) with M ≤ S1 < S2 ≤ M . For each pair (S1, S2), Line 6 computes the list Γ * using Theorem 4. Lines 8-12 compute Loss of the first pair in Γ * and update Best loss and Bestsetting if necessary. Line 13 returns Bestsetting. The algorithm uses both loss-based pruning and privacy-based pruning. The former is through the prefix Γ obtained by the upper bound Best loss as computed in Lemma 6, and the latter is through the binary search of valid pairs implicit in the computation of Γ * . To tighten up Best loss , Lines 4 and 5 examine smaller sizes (S1, S2) before larger ones.
Algorithms for Multi-Size Bucket Settings
A natural next step is to extend the solution for the twosize problem to the multi-size problem. To do so, we must extend Theorem 3 to validate a three-size bucket setting. The next example shows that this does not work.
Example 5. Let |B1| = |B2| = 20, |B3| = 30, and |T | = 70. There are 11 values x1, · · · , x11: oi = 5 for 1 ≤ i ≤ 10, and o11 = 20. Suppose that for 1 ≤ i ≤ 10, ai1 = ai2 = 0, ai3 = 5, and a11,1 = a11,2 = a11,3 = 20. The following extended version of PC, FC and CC in Theorem 3: ∀i : ai1 + ai2 + ai3 ≥ oi; for j = 1, 2, 3, i aij ≥ |Bj|; |T | = |B1| + |B2| + |B3|. However, there is no valid record assignment to these buckets. Note that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 10, ai1 = ai2 = 0, none of the records for xi can be assigned to the buckets for B1 or B2. So the 50 records for xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 10, must be assigned to the buckets for B3, but B3 has a capacity of 30.
Our solution is recursively applying TwoSizeBucketing to reduce Loss. This algorithm, MultiSizeBucketing, is given in Algorithm 2. The input consists of T , a set of records, B, a set of buckets of the same size, and F , M, M as usual, where |T | = s(B). The algorithm applies TwoSizeBucketing to find the optimal two-size bucket setting (B1, B2) for T (Line 1). If Loss(B1 ∪ B2) < Loss(B), Line 3 partitions the records of T into T1 and T2 between B1 and B2. 
ADDITIONAL AUXILIARY INFORMATION
Dealing with an adversary armed with additional auxiliary information is one of the hardest problems in data privacy. As pointed out by [14] , there is no free lunch in data privacy. Thus, instead of dealing with all types of auxiliary information, we consider two previously identified attacks, namely, corruption attack [21] and negative association attack [13] [17] . To focus on the main idea, we consider Fprivacy such that f i is the same for all xi's. In this case, F -privacy degenerates into -diversity with = 1/f i and the solution in Section 5.1 returns buckets of size S1 = or S2 = + 1, and each record in a bucket has a distinct SA value.
In the corruption attack, an adversary has acquired from an external source the SA value xi of some record r in the data. r is called a corrupted record. Armed with this knowledge, the adversary will boost the accuracy of inference by excluding one occurrence of xi when inferring the sensitive value of the remaining records that share the same bucket with r. To combat the accuracy boosting, we propose to inject some small number σ of fake SA values into each bucket g, where a fake value does not actually belong to any record in the bucket. To ensure that the adversary cannot distinguish a fake value from a real value, a fake value must be from the domain of SA and must be distinct in the bucket. Now, for each bucket g, the table QIT contains |g| records and the table ST contains |g| + σ distinct SA values, in a random order. The adversary knows σ of these SA values are fake but does not know which ones.
Suppose now that in a corruption attack, the adversary is able to corrupt q records in a bucket g, where q ≤ |g|, so |g| − q + σ values remain in g, σ of which are fake. Note that |g| and σ are constants. Therefore, the more records the adversary is able to corrupt (i.e., a larger q), the larger the proportion of fake values among the remaining records in the bucket (i.e., σ |g|−q+σ ) and the more uncertain the adversary is about whether a remaining value in g is a real value or a fake value. Even if all but one record in a bucket are corrupted, the adversary has only 1/(1 + σ) certainty that a remaining value is a real value. The price to pay for this additional protection is the distortion by the σ fake values added to each bucket.
The study in [13] [17] shows that under unusual circumstances a negative association between a non-sensitive value z and a SA value x may be learnt from the published data T * , which states that a record having z is less likely to have x. Using such negative association, an adversary could exclude unlikely choices x when inferring the sensitive value for an individual having the non-sensitive value z. Since this attack shares the same mechanism as the corruption attack, i.e., by excluding unlikely values, the above solution proposed for corruption attack can be applied to deter the negative association attack, with one difference: a fake value should not be easily excluded for any record using the negative association knowledge. To ensure this, the publisher can first learn the negative association from T * and inject only those fake values into a bucket that cannot be removed using the learnt negative association.
Parameters
Settings 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES
We evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the algorithms proposed in Section 5. For this purpose, we utilized the real data set CENSUS containing personal information of 500K American adults. This data set was previously used in [22] , [15] and [19] . Table 5 shows the eight discrete attributes of the data. Two base tables were generated from CENSUS. The first table OCC has Occupation as SA and the 7 remaining attributes as the QI-attributes. The second table EDU has Education as SA and the 7 remaining attributes as the QI-attributes. OCC-n and EDU-n denote the data sets of OCC and EDU of the cardinality n. Figure 2 shows the frequency distribution of SA. The parameters and settings are summarized in Table 4 with the default setting in bold face. We evaluate our algorithms by three criteria: suitability for handling varied sensitivity, data utility, and scalability.
Criterion 1: Handling Variable Sensitivity
Our first objective is to study the suitability of F -privacy for handling variable sensitivity and skewed distribution of sensitive values. For concreteness, we specify F -privacy by f i = min{1, θ × fi + 0.02}, where θ is the privacy coefficient chosen from {2, 4, 8, 16, 32}. This specification models a linear relationship between the sensitivity f i and the frequency For comparison purposes, we apply -diversity to model the above F -privacy, where is set to 1/minif i (Remark 1). For the OCC-300K and EDU-300K data sets, which have the minimum fi of 0.18% and 0.44%, respectively, Figure 3 plots the relationship between θ and . Except for θ = 32, a rather large is required to enforce F -privacy. As such, the buckets produced by Anatomy [22] have a large size or + 1, thus, a large Loss. A large also renders -diversity too restrictive. As discussed in Remark 1, 1/ ≥ maxifi is necessary for having a -diversity solution. With OCC-300K's maximum fi being 7.5% and EDU-300K's maximum being 27.3%, this condition is violated for all ≥ 14 in the case of OCC-300K and all ≥ 4 in the case of EDU-300K, thus, for most Fprivacy considered. This study suggests that -diversity is not suitable for handling sensitive values of varied sensitivity and skewed distribution. 
Criterion 2: Data Utility
Our second objective is to evaluate the utility of T * . We consider two utility metrics, Mean Squared Error (MSE) (Definition 3) and Relative Error (RE) for count queries previously used in [22] . We compare TwoSizeBucketing, denoted by "TwoSize", and MultiSizeBucketing, denoted by "MultiSize", against two other methods. (i) Optimal multi-size bucketing, denoted by "Optimal", is the exact solution to the optimal multi-size bucket setting problem, solved by an integer linear program. "Optimal" provides the theoretical lower bound on Loss, but it is feasible only for a small domain size |SA|.
(ii) Anatomy [22] with -diversity being set to = 1/minif i . Except for "Anatomy", the minimum bucket size M is set to min{ 1/f i } and the maximum bucket size M is set to 50. Figure 4 shows M SE vs the privacy coefficient θ on the default OCC-300K and EDU-300K. The study in Section 7.1 shows that for most F -privacy considered the corresponding -diversity cannot be achieved on the OCC and EDU data sets. For comparison purposes, we compute the M SE for "Anatomy" based on the bucket size of or +1 while ignoring the privacy constraint. "Anatomy" has a significantly higher M SE than all other methods across all settings of θ because the bucket sizes and + 1 are large. "TwoSize" has only a slightly higher M SE than "MultiSize", which has only a slightly higher M SE than "Optimal". This study suggests that the restriction to the two-size bucketing problem causes only a small loss of optimality and that the heuristic solution is a good approximation to the optimal solution of the multisize bucket setting problem. 
Mean Squared Error (MSE)

Relative Error (RE)
We adapt count queries Q of the form from [22] :
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM T WHERE pred(A1) AND ... AND pred(Aq d ) AND pred(SA) A1, · · · , Aq d are randomly selected QI-attributes. q d is the query dimensionality and is randomly selected from {1, · · · , 7} with equal probability, where 7 is the total number of QI attributes. For any attribute A, pred(A) has the form
where ai is a random value from the domain of A. As in [22] , the value of b depends on the expected query selectivity, which was set to 1% here. The details can be found in [22] . The answer act to Q using T is the number of records in T that satisfy the condition in the WHERE clause. We created a pool of 5,000 count queries of the above form. For each query Q in the pool, we compute the estimated answer est using T * in the same way as in [22] . The relative error (RE) on Q is defined to be RE = |act − est|/act. We report the average RE over all queries in the pool. Figure 5 shows RE vs the privacy coefficient θ on the default OCC-300K and EDU-300K. For the OCC data set, the maximum RE is slightly over 10%. The RE's for "TwoSize", "MultiSize", and "Optimal" are relatively close to each other, which is consistent with the earlier finding on similar M SE for these algorithms. For the EDU data set, all RE's are no more than 10%. "MultiSize" improves upon "TwoSize" by about 2%, and "Optimal" improves upon "MultiSize" by about 2%. This study suggests that the solutions of the optimal two-size bucketing and the heuristic multi-size bucketing are highly accurate for answering count queries, with the RE below 10% for most F -privacy considered. "Anatomy" was not included since there is no corresponding -diversity solution for most F -privacy considered (see Section 7.1). 
Criterion 3: Scalability
Lastly, we evaluate the scalability for handling large data sets. We focus on TwoSizeBucketing because it is a key component of MultiSizeBucketing. "No-pruning" refers to the sequential search of the full list Γ without any pruning; "Losspruning" refers to the loss-based pruning in Section 5.1.2; "Full-pruning" refers to TwoSizeBucketing in Section 5.1.3, which exploits both loss-based pruning and privacy-based pruning. "Optimal" refers to the integer linear program solution to the two-size bucketing problem. We study the Runtime with respect to the cardinality |T | and the domain size |SA|. The default privacy coefficient setting θ = 8 is used. All algorithms were implemented in C++ and run on a Windows 64 bits Platform with CPU of 2.53 GHz and memory size of 12GB. Each algorithm was run 100 times and the average time is reported here. Figure 6 shows Runtime vs the cardinality |T |. "Fullpruning" takes the least time and "No-pruning" takes the most time. "Loss-pruning" significantly reduces the time compared to "No-pruning", but has an increasing trend in Runtime as |T | increases because of the sequential search of the first valid pair in the list Γ . In contrast, a larger |T | does not affect "Full-pruning" much because ""Full-pruning" locates the first valid pair by a binary search over Γ . "Optimal" takes less time than "No-pruning" because the domain size |SA| is relatively small. The next experiment shows that the comparison is reversed for a large domain size |SA|.
Scalability with |T |
Scalability with |SA|
We scale up |SA| for OCC-500K and EDU-500K by a factor γ, where γ is ranged over 2, 4, 8, 16, 32 and 64. Assume that the domain of SA has the form {0, 1, · · · , m − 1}. For each record t in T , we replace t[SA] in t with the value γ × t[SA] + r, where r is an integer selected randomly from the range [0, γ − 1] with equal probability. Thus the new do- main of SA has the size m × γ. Figure 7 shows Runtime vs the scale-up factor γ. As γ increases, Runtime of "Optimal" increases quickly because the integer linear programming is exponential in the domain size |SA|. Runtime of the other algorithms increases little because the complexity of these algorithms is linear in the domain size |SA|. Interestingly, as |SA| increases, Runtime of "No-pruning" decreases. A close look reveals that when there are more SA values, fi and f i become smaller and the minimum bucket size M becomes larger, which leads to a short Γ list. A shorter Γ list benefits most the sequential search based "No-pruning". In summary, we showed that the proposed methods can better handle sensitive values of varied sensitivity and skewed distribution, therefore, retain more information in the data, and the solution is scalable for large data sets.
CONCLUSION
Although differential privacy has many nice properties, it does not address the concern of inferential privacy, which arises due to the wide use of statistical inferences in advanced applications. On the other hand, previous approaches to inferential privacy suffered from major limitations, namely, lack of flexibility in handling varied sensitivity, poor utility, and vulnerability to auxiliary information. This paper developed a novel solution to overcome these limitations. Extensive experimental results confirmed the suitability of the proposed solution for handling sensitive values of varied sensitivity and skewed distribution.
